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In a recent exchange between U.S. and Chinese experts, the Chinese side, citing minor shifts in language, insisted that Beijing was distancing itself from Vladimir Putin’s war.
在美国和中国专家最近的一次交流中，中方语言上的细微变化，坚称北京正在远离黄俄の爹的战争。For the American participants, according to Jude Blanchette of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who was there, the disbelieving response was: “Oh, really?”
据在场的战略与国际研究中心的裘德布兰切特说，对于美国参与者来说，他们的反应是难以置信：“哦，真的吗？”“Their argument was that language had been moving, albeit subtly, to show displeasure with Russia,” Blanchette said about the discussion during the “track-two” nongovernmental exchange. “That struck us as pretty weak sauce.”
“他们的论点是，语言一直在变化，尽管是微妙的，以表达对俄罗斯的不满，”布兰切特谈到“第二次”非政府交流期间的讨论时说。 “这让我们觉得很弱。”Three weeks into the largest military clash in Europe since World War II, China’s effort to displease neither Russia nor the international coalition imposing sanctions on Putin is looking increasingly untenable.
自二战以来欧洲最大规模的军事冲突已过去三周，中国试图不让俄罗斯和对黄俄の爹实施制裁的国际联盟不高兴的努力看起来越来越站不住脚。A disconnect is growing between the image of neutrality Beijing wants to project and President Xi Jinping’s long-term strategy of fostering ties with Russia as a critical partner in the standoff with the United States and its allies.
北京希望展现的中立形象与希望在与美国及其盟国的对峙中作为关键伙伴促进与俄罗斯关系的长期战略之间的脱节正在加剧。Pressure from Western governments — and from pockets of Chinese academia and public opinion — is mounting on the Chinese leadership to use its economic ties with Russia to force a cease-fire. But to do so is a risk for Chinese leaders, who have little experience dealing with geopolitical crises far from their shores.
来自西方政府——以及来自中国学术界和公众舆论——的压力越来越大，要求中国领导人利用与俄罗斯的经济联系来强制停火。但这样做对中国领导人来说是一种风险，他们在处理远离本国的地缘政治危机方面经验不足。“The majority of the international community is very displeased by China’s position, and China’s international image may not get better as a result,” said Tong Zhao, a Beijing-based fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “It looks like China isn’t very skilled at playing international geopolitical games.”
“国际社会大多数人对中国的立场非常不满，中国的国际形象可能不会因此而改善，”卡内基国际和平基金会驻北京研究员童昭说。 “看起来中国不太擅长玩国际地缘政治游戏。”Despite some attempts to distance itself from Russia, he said, Beijing’s approach remains fundamentally the same and “very generic, because I don’t think China knows at this moment what major policy changes it should adopt.”
他说，尽管有试图与俄罗斯保持距离，但北京的做法基本保持不变，“非常笼统，因为我认为中国目前不知道它应该采取哪些重大政策改变。”Among shifts in wording was Xi’s decision to call the invasion a “war” for the first time when speaking to his German and French counterparts last week — a departure from weeks of officials describing the war as a “special military operation” or a “situation.”
措辞的变化之一是希望上周在与德国和法国同行谈话时首次将入侵称为“战争”——这与数周以来将战争描述为“特殊军事行动”或“局势”的官方陈述不同。”China’s ambassador to Ukraine, Fan Xianrong, on Monday met with the head of the Lviv regional administration and promised that China would be “a good force for Ukraine both economically and politically.”
中国驻乌克兰大使范显荣周一会见了利沃夫地区政府负责人，并承诺中国将“在经济和政治上成为乌克兰的一支好力量”。These tweaks in diplomatic messaging and overtures toward Ukraine have been seized upon as positive signals by those in Europe who are eager for China to use its leverage over Russia to push for a negotiated settlement.
这些外交信息的调整和对乌克兰的提议被欧洲那些渴望中国利用其对俄罗斯的影响力推动谈判解决的人视为积极信号。But their hopes probably are unfounded, according to Andrew Small, a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund. “There are small bits of tactical positioning to deal with the fallout of the backing they have extended to Russia, but nothing deviates from the fundamentals of support [for Putin],” he said.
但德国马歇尔基金会跨大西洋高级研究员安德鲁·斯莫尔表示，他们的希望可能是没有根据的。 “有一些战略调整会影响他们对俄罗斯的支持，但没有任何事情偏离支持[对黄俄の爹]的基本面，”他说。Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has suggested that his country is willing to mediate, but China has little experience in playing peacemaker in international disputes. For years in China, foreign policy has been an extension of domestic political priorities, where the top priority is preserving regime security.
中国外交部长王毅曾表示，中国愿意进行斡旋，但中国在国际争端中扮演和平调解人的经验很少。多年来，在中国，外交政策一直是国内政治优先事项的延伸，其中首要任务是维护政权安全。The few times that China has been directly involved in talks have involved issues in its immediate sphere of influence, such as hosting the six-party talks to slow North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programs, or arranging talks between rebel groups and the junta in Myanmar to avoid a refugee crisis on the China-Myanmar border.
中国直接参与谈判的几次都涉及其直接影响范围内的问题，例如主持六方会谈以减缓朝鲜的核和导弹发展计划，或安排叛乱组织与缅甸军政府之间的会谈避免中缅边境发生难民危机。The best China could do, Small said, would be to host meetings or shuttle messages between parties, but officials lack the understanding or incentive to pressure parties toward a lasting settlement. “They aren’t going to run around coming up with new proposals for security arrangements in Europe, because it might blow up in their faces,” he said.
斯莫尔说，中国能做的最好的事情是主持会议或在各方之间传递信息，但官员们缺乏理解或激励各方向各方施压以达成持久解决方案。 “他们不会到处为欧洲的安全安排提出新的建议，因为这可能会在他们面前爆发，”他说。China’s efforts to cast itself as a neutral party were further undermined when its Foreign Ministry last week lent support to Russian conspiracy theories about U.S.-backed bioweapons programs in Ukraine.
当中国外交部上周支持俄罗斯关于美国支持的乌克兰生物武器计划的阴谋论时，中国将自己塑造为中立形象的努力受到进一步破坏。“This bodes ill not only for China’s relationship with the United States, but also for its ties with Europe,” analysts at the Alliance for Securing Democracy wrote in a recent study of coordinated Chinese-Russian disinformation. “China’s response to Russia’s invasion is seen as a litmus test — and Beijing is failing.”
“这不仅预示着中国与美国的关系，而且也预示着中国与欧洲的关系，”保障民主联盟的分析师在最近一项关于中俄协调虚假信息的研究中写道。 “中国对俄罗斯入侵的反应被视为试金石——而北京正在失败。”There are arguments within China that Beijing is making a tactical error in sticking with Moscow and lashing out at the West. An unusually frank essay by a senior Chinese scholar published over the weekend argued that the attempt to split the difference between Russia and the West could alienate much of the world and leave China worse off.
中国国内有争论称，北京在坚持莫斯科并抨击西方方面犯了一个战术错误。一位中国资深学者周末发表的一篇异常坦率的文章指出，试图分裂俄罗斯和西方之间的差异可能会疏远世界大部分地区，并使中国的境况变得更糟。To safeguard China’s interests, Beijing should choose “the lesser of two evils, and unloading the burden of Russia as soon as possible,” wrote Hu Wei, the vice chairman of the Public Policy Research Center of the Counselor’s Office of the State Council, China’s cabinet. “At present, it is estimated that there is still a window period of one or two weeks before China loses its wiggle room. China must act decisively.”
中国国务院参事室公共政策研究中心副主任胡伟写道，为了维护中国的利益，北京应该选择“两害相权取其轻，尽快卸下俄罗斯的包袱”。内阁。 “目前，估计中国离失去回旋余地还有一到两周的窗口期。中国必须果断行动。”China’s leadership appears unmoved by such appeals. Hu’s article was censored soon after it was published.
中国领导层似乎对这种呼吁无动于衷。胡的文章发表后不久就遭到审查。Chinese officials instead promote Russia’s “principle of indivisible security” and argue that Putin’s security concerns are legitimate and caused by the expansion of NATO and Western support for “color revolutions” and democratic reforms. Although Chinese officials maintain that China supports peace and ending the war as soon as possible, state media are overwhelmingly pro-Russian in their reporting, and antiwar voices and commentary have been silenced.
中国官员反而宣扬俄罗斯的“安全不可分割原则”，并认为黄俄の爹的安全担忧是合理的，是由北约扩张和西方对“颜色革命”和民主改革的支持造成的。尽管中国官员坚称中国支持和平并尽快结束战争，但官方媒体在报道中绝大多数是亲俄的，反战的声音和评论已被压制。In a year when Xi is expected to break with tradition and take on a controversial third term and extend his rule over the country indefinitely, a U-turn on the Ukraine crisis is unthinkable.
不到一年，希望就将打破传统并继续其有争议的第三个任期，并其对中国的统治无限期延长，因此对待乌克兰危机的态度大掉头是不可想象的。“A dramatic change on Russia is going to raise questions about his leadership,” said Yun Sun, the director of the China program at the Stimson Center.
史汀生中心中国项目主任孙云说：“对俄罗斯态度的巨大变化将引发人们对他的领导能力的质疑。”Many of Russia’s concerns about U.S. ideological hegemony and Western security blocs are ones China shares. Watching how Western countries pressure Russia may have cemented a view that repairing relations with the West is a lost cause.
俄罗斯与中国一样，对美国意识形态霸权和西方安全集团的有许多担忧。观察西方国家如何向俄罗斯施压，这可能巩固了一种观点，即修复与西方的关系是徒劳的。“This only contributes to Chinese view that the West’s next strategic target is China, and there is going to be a showdown between China and the West sooner or later,” Zhao said.
“这只会助长中国认为西方的下一个战略目标是中国，中西方之间迟早会摊牌，”赵说。The foundational shift in China’s position toward Russia can be seen by comparing its response to Ukraine against how it dealt with Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Then, Beijing adopted a far more cautious stance, never recognized Russia’s claim and steered well clear of supporting Moscow’s demands for NATO to be rolled back to its smaller, pre-1997 status.
中国对俄罗斯的立场发生了根本性转变，可以将其与 2014 年黄俄の爹吞并克里米亚的后对乌克兰的反应进行比较。彼时，北京采取了更为谨慎的立场，从未承认俄罗斯的主张，并且完全不支持莫斯科的主张。要求北约恢复到 1997 年以前的较小地位。This time, while China has voiced dismay about the conflict, its support for Russia’s anti-NATO stance has not wavered.
这一次，虽然中国对冲突表达了失望，但对俄罗斯反北约立场的支持并没有动摇。“This is a long-term bet that Xi Jinping has made,” said Small, the German Marshall Fund fellow. “There are a lot of relationships that China has been willing to write off, but there is also a view that you stick to certain countries and Russia is one you will bend over backward for.”
“这是希望下的一个长期赌注，”德国马歇尔基金研究员斯莫尔说。 “有很多关系是中国愿意取消的，但也有一种观点认为，你可以和某些国家保持紧密联系，但俄罗斯是中国必须要跪的国家。”
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