[2022-06-02] The Economist - 意识形态与繁荣

 

LEADERS
Ideology versus prosperity
How Xi Jinping is damaging China’s economy
领导人
意识形态与繁荣
希望是如何损害中国经济的

OVER THE past 20 years China has been the biggest and most reliable source of growth in the world economy. It contributed a quarter of the rise in global GDP over that period and expanded in 79 of 80 quarters. For most of the period since China opened up after Mao’s death, the Communist Party has taken a practical approach to making the country richer, mixing market reforms with state control. Now, however, China’s economy is in danger. The immediate issue is its zero-covid campaign, which has caused a slump and may condemn the economy to a stopstart pattern. That is compounding a bigger problem: President Xi Jinping’s ideological struggle to remake state capitalism (see Briefing). If it stays on this path China will grow more slowly and be less predictable, with big consequences for it and the world.
在过去的 20 年里，中国一直是世界经济中最大、最可靠的增长源。 在此期间，它贡献了全球 GDP 增长的四分之一，并在 80 个季度中的 79 个季度增长。 在毛去世后中国开放以来的大部分时间里，共产党采取了切实可行的方法来使国家更加富裕，将市场改革与国家控制相结合。 然而，现在中国经济正处于危险之中。 眼前的问题是它的清零运动，这导致了经济衰退，并可能使经济陷入停摆状态。 这加剧了一个更大的问题：希望主席重塑国家资本主义的意识形态斗争（见简报）。 如果它继续走这条路，中国将增长得更慢，更难以预测，对它和世界产生重大影响。

After nearly two months the lockdown of Shanghai is easing, but China is far from being covid-free, with fresh outbreaks in Beijing and Tianjin. More than 200m people have been living under restrictions and the economy is reeling. Retail sales in April were 11% lower than a year earlier and purchases of KFC, cars and Cartier are weak. Although some workers are living on factory floors, industrial output and export volumes have dipped. For the full year China may struggle to grow much faster than America for the first time since 1990, in the aftermath of the massacre near Tiananmen Square. For Mr Xi the timing is awful: after the 20th party congress later this year, he intends to be confirmed for a third term as president, breaking the recent norm that leaders bow out after two.
近两个月后，上海的封锁正在放松，但中国远未完全摆脱武汉肺炎病毒，北京和天津爆发了新的疫情。 超过 2 亿人的生活受到限制，经济正在步履蹒跚。 4 月份的零售额比去年同期下降 11%，肯德基、汽车和卡地亚的购买量疲软。 尽管一些工人住在工厂车间，但工业产出和出口量已经下降。 自 1990 年以来，在天安门广场大屠杀之后，中国全年的增长速度可能首次超过美国。 对希望来说，时机很糟糕：在今年晚些时候召开的第 20 次党代会之后，他打算被确认连任第三个国家主席，这打破了近期领导人在两届之后就下台的常态。

It is, however, Mr Xi who bears much responsibility for the twin blows to the economy. The first is his zero-covid policy, which has been enforced for 28 months. The party fears that opening up would lead to an exit wave that could kill millions. That may be true, but it has wasted precious time: 100m people over 60 are not triple-jabbed. It refuses to import more effective Western mRNA vaccines. Instead the plan may be to push zero-covid into next year. China has backed out of hosting the Asian Cup, a football contest, in June 2023. There is talk of permanent testing stations and a standing army to swab nostrils for ever. Since Omicron is highly transmissible, more outbreaks and lockdowns are inevitable. But since the zero-covid policy is identified with Mr Xi, any criticism of it is viewed as sabotage.
然而，希望对经济遭受的双重打击负有很大责任。 首先是他的清零政策，该政策已经执行了 28 个月。 该党担心开放会导致可能导致数百万人死亡的退出浪潮。 这可能是真的，但它浪费了宝贵的时间：1 亿 60 岁以上的人没有被三连戳。 它拒绝进口更有效的西方 mRNA 疫苗。 相反，该计划可能是将零疫情推向明年。 中国已经退出了在 2023 年 6 月举办的亚洲杯足球比赛。有关于永久检测站和常备军永远拭鼻孔的说法。 由于 Omicron 具有高度传播性，更多的爆发和封锁是不可避免的。 但由于希望认同清零政策，任何对其的批评都被视为蓄意破坏。

That same ideological zeal is behind the second shock, a series of economic initiatives that form what Mr Xi calls his “new development concept”, which is meant to address “great changes unseen in a century”, such as the Sino-American split. The goals are rational: to tackle inequality, monopolies and debt, and to ensure that China dominates new technologies and is fortified against Western sanctions. Yet in all cases Mr Xi believes the party must take the lead, and implementation has been punitive and erratic. A blizzard of fines, new regulations and purges has caused the dynamic tech industry, which contributes 8% of GDP, to stagnate. And a savage but incomplete crackdown on the property sector, responsible for over a fifth of GDP, has led to a funding crunch—one reason why housing sales fell by 47% in April compared with a year earlier.
第二次冲击背后也是同样的意识形态热情，一系列经济举措形成了希望所谓的“新发展理念”，旨在应对“百年未有之大变局”，例如中美分裂。 目标是合理的：解决不平等、垄断和债务问题，并确保中国主导新技术并加强对抗西方制裁。 然而，在所有情况下，希望都认为党必须带头，而且执行起来是惩罚性的和反复无常的。 一连串的罚款、新法规和清洗导致占 GDP 8% 的充满活力的科技行业停滞不前。 对占 GDP 的五分之一以上的房地产行业进行野蛮但不彻底的镇压导致资金紧缩——这也是 4 月份房屋销售量同比下降 47% 的原因。

The government hopes a vast stimulus programme that is in the works will help it meet the official growth target of 5.5% for 2022 and calm nerves ahead of the congress. On May 19th Li Keqiang, the prime minister, urged officials to “act decisively” to restore growth, and the central bank cut mortgage rates. The party has tried to reassure terrified tech tycoons. A likely next step is a big bond-financed government infrastructure programme.
政府希望正在进行的一项大规模刺激计划将帮助其实现 2022 年 5.5% 的官方增长目标，并在大会召开前平息紧张情绪。 5 月 19 日，总理李克强敦促官员“果断行动”恢复增长，央行下调抵押贷款利率。 该党试图安抚惊恐的科技大亨。 下一步可能是大型债券融资的政府基础设施计划。

But more piles of debt and acres of concrete won’t obviate the need for draconian lockdowns or reduce the risks from Mr Xi’s economic model. It involves expanding the scope of the least productive part of the economy: the government-run one. China’s industrial policy has had formidable successes, for example building a dominant global position in advanced batteries. Mr Xi hopes that technology and a new cohort of state investment funds will make decision-making more agile. But don’t forget all the dismal failures, from rust-belt industries to microchips.
但更多的债务和数英亩的混凝土不会消除严厉封锁的必要性，也不会降低希望经济模式带来的风险。 它涉及扩大经济中生产力最低的部分的范围：政府经营的部分。 中国的产业政策取得了巨大的成功，例如在先进电池领域建立了全球主导地位。 希望希望科技和一批新的国家投资基金能够让决策更加灵活。 但不要忘记所有令人沮丧的失败，从锈带工业到微芯片。

Meanwhile the incentives in the most productive part of the economy, the private sector, have been damaged (see Finance & economics section). You can see that in the financial markets, which have seen large outflows. The cost of capital has risen: Chinese shares trade at a 45% discount to American ones, a nearrecord gap. The calculations of investors and entrepreneurs are changing. Some fear that the financial upside for any business will be capped by a party that is suspicious of private wealth and power. Venture capitalists say they have switched to betting on the biggest subsidies, not the best ideas. For the first time in 40 years no major sector of the economy is undergoing liberalising reforms. Without them, growth will suffer.
与此同时，经济中最具生产力的部分——私营部门——的激励措施受到了损害（见金融与经济部分）。 你可以在金融市场上看到这一点，金融市场出现了大量资金外流。 资本成本上升：中国股票的交易价格比美国股票低 45%，接近创纪录的差距。 投资者和企业家的计算方式正在发生变化。 一些人担心，任何企业的财务优势都会被一个怀疑私人财富和权力的政党所限制。 风险资本家表示，他们已经转向押注最大的补贴，而不是最好的想法。 40 年来第一次没有主要经济部门进行自由化改革。 没有它们，增长将受到影响。

Mr Xi’s ideological economy has big implications for the world. Though stimulus could gin up demand, more lockdowns are likely, imperilling a global economy flirting with recession. In business, China’s size and sophistication make it impossible for multinationals to ignore. But more will rebalance supply chains away from China, as Apple is reportedly doing. Chinese champions may dominate some industries of the 2030s, but the West is likely to become a warier importer of Chinese products. In diplomacy, a less ambitious and independent private sector means China’s presence abroad will be more state-led and political. It may become more malign, but also less effective, as our special report on China and Africa explains.
希望的意识形态经济对世界具有重大影响。 尽管刺激措施可能会刺激需求，但可能会出现更多的封锁，从而危及正在陷入衰退的全球经济。 在商业上，中国的规模和成熟度让跨国公司无法忽视。 但据报道，苹果正在采取更多措施来重新平衡中国以外的供应链。 中国领军企业可能会在 2030 年代主导某些行业，但西方可能会成为对中国产品更加谨慎的进口国。 在外交方面，不那么雄心勃勃和独立的私营部门意味着中国在海外的存在将更多地由国家主导和政治化。 正如我们关于中国和非洲的特别报告所解释的那样，它可能会变得更加恶毒，但效果也会降低。

The perils of one-man rule
And what of life inside a more insular China? While people vent online about lockdowns and lost jobs, this is unlikely to translate into unrest thanks to surveillance, propaganda and broad support for the party’s goals. Some technocrats disagree with the country’s leftward shift but lack the power and courage required to object to it. And to the extent it can be discerned from the black box of elite politics, there is no rival to Mr Xi, who is 68 (see China section). Yet in the run-up to a party congress that may see him secure power until at least 2027, the shortcomings of oneman rule in the world’s second-largest economy are glaring.
一个人统治的危险
而在一个更加封闭的中国生活又如何呢？ 虽然人们在网上发泄关于封锁和失业的言论，但由于监视、宣传和对党的目标的广泛支持，这不太可能转化为骚乱。 一些技术官僚不同意该国的左倾，但缺乏反对它所需的力量和勇气。 从精英政治的黑匣子中可以看出，68 岁的希望没有对手（见中国部分）。 然而，在可能让他至少在 2027 年之前掌权的党代会前夕，世界第二大经济体单人统治的缺点显而易见。

 

 

 

 

 

标红字体均为楼主更改，与原文作者无关。[/b]

希望这次希望不大了啊！操！[/b]

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